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1 Introduction
The presence of career concerns￿ concerns for the e⁄ect of present outcomes on future compensation￿
a⁄ects the incentive structure underlying an agency relationship. Present outcomes a⁄ect the
agent￿ s future compensation when there is uncertainty about some of the agent￿ s characteristics
(which we will refer to as his ￿ability￿ ) that a⁄ect the future expected productivity of the agency
relationship. The principal updates her beliefs about the agent￿ s ability after observing each pe-
riod￿ s outcome. This may lead to e¢ ciency costs, as noted by, e.g., Holmstr￿m and Ricart i Costa
(1986) and Hermalin (1993) in an investment-decision setting. A risk-neutral principal is concerned
with maximizing expected pro￿ts, and would like for the agent to choose investment projects ac-
cordingly. When making an investment decision, however, the agent must take into account the
reputational risk that it entails: his future compensation likely depends on the outcome following
his investment decision. If a risk-averse agent cannot be fully insured against reputational risk
following initial outcomes, he will be willing to forego pro￿tability in favor of self-insurance. In the
case of Holmstr￿m and Ricart i Costa (1986), this translates into excessively cautious investing; in
the case of Hermalin (1993) it translates into choosing noisy rather than pro￿table projects. To
see the main intuition take, as a cynical example, that of a student who received a bad grade in
an exam. The student might argue that the result is particularly noisy and uninformative about
￿ability￿because of special circumstances that hindered his performance. If this is true, a Bayesian
grader should correct the grade upwards towards the prior mean. An average risk-averse student
has thus clear incentives to make sure that circumstances which hinder performance are in fact
present before or during the exam, which is, of course, ine¢ cient.
Research in psychology, however, suggests that individuals tend to overestimate their skills and
abilities, as well as the likelihood of favorable outcomes.1 Allowing for heterogeneous beliefs in
a model of career concerns, we show that the e⁄ect of overcon￿dence on equilibrium investment
decisions is reverse to the e⁄ect of reputational risk.2 In our model, the agent￿ s ability a⁄ects
the outcome distribution following investment in a given project. In a common-priors setting,
1See Taylor and Brown (1988) for a survey this research.
2We will refer to an overcon￿dent agent as one who is relatively optimistic about his own ability. Although other
authors refer to this as optimism, that term seems to overlook the fact that the agent is actually instrumental in
the outcome. Excessive self-con￿dence (thus the choice of ￿overcon￿dence￿ ) is more telling of the self-enhancing bias
that I wish to introduce in the model.
1there is little upside to the reputational risk the agent faces: investing introduces risk in future
compensation, and the principal￿ s beliefs about the agent￿ s ability are not expected to deviate, on
average, from their common prior. An overcon￿dent agent, on the other hand, expects the principal
to update her beliefs about his ability upwards more often than not: according to his beliefs, the
principal holds overly pessimistic prior beliefs. So even though a risk-averse agent will generally
shun investment because of the reputational risk he bears in terms of future compensation, an
overcon￿dent one expects investment to bring, on average, positive news about his ability and
thus higher future average compensation. As a consequence, agent overcon￿dence alleviates the
incentive problem arising from risk aversion in a repeated investment-decision setting.
Career concerns were initially studied within the framework of moral hazard. Holmstr￿m (1982)
showed that career concerns alleviate the moral hazard problem: the implicit incentives in future
remuneration are a partial substitute for explicit incentives when these are not available. Because
of career concerns, an agent is willing to take a costly action in early stages (e.g. exert a high level
of e⁄ort) in an attempt to increase the market￿ s perception of his ability and with it his future
compensation. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) allow for explicit incentives in such a setting, and show
that the implicit incentives permit the principal to lower the (costly) explicit incentives in early
stages. They also review empirical evidence which suggests that young executives do receive lower-
powered incentives than executives who are close to retirement. Allowing for overcon￿dence in such
a setting would a⁄ect contracting through its e⁄ect on both moral hazard and on career concerns
per se. The e⁄ects of overcon￿dence in a moral-hazard setting have been studied by Adrian and
Wester￿eld (2007), de la Rosa (2007), and Santos-Pinto (2007); in this paper we will focus on the
e⁄ects of overcon￿dence in a career-concerns setting without moral hazard.
This paper is related to the recent strand of literature which studies the e⁄ects of agent over-
con￿dence in di⁄erent principal-agent settings. The three papers cited above study the e⁄ects
of overcon￿dence in a moral-hazard setting; Goel and Thakor (2007) and Santos-Pinto (2008) in
tournaments; Gervais and Goldstein (2007) in a model of teams with complementarities; Gervais,
Heaton, and Odean (2003) in a model of information acquisition. This paper is, to my knowledge,
the ￿rst to analyze the e⁄ects of overcon￿dence on contracting in the presence of career concerns.
Section 2 introduces a simple two-period investment-decision model. Several principals compete
to hire an agent by making contract o⁄ers, which consist of a payment schedule and an investment
rule which maps the realization of an observable signal to the decision ￿invest￿or ￿do not invest.￿
The agent is paid at the beginning of each period, so his payment cannot be contingent on same-
period outcomes; it will likely depend, however, on past performance. After the agent is paid, the
participants observe a (public) signal that is correlated with the revenue distribution of a given
2investment project. This signal is veri￿able, and thus contractible.3 The revenue distribution also
depends on the agent￿ s ability, which is unknown to both principal and agent.
Section 3 recursively solves for the equilibrium in a setting in which neither agent nor principal
can bind themselves to the agency relationship across periods. Principals o⁄er a new ￿xed-salary
contract at the beginning of each period. The agent thus bears all of the reputational risk implicit
in learning about ability following ￿rst-period investment. In the second period the agent no longer
has any career concerns, so that the principal will implement the investment rule she believes
to be optimal. Payment to the agent at the beginning of the period is a sunk cost from the
principal￿ s point of view, so she simply invests whenever expected pro￿ts from the project are non-
negative. The agent￿ s second-period compensation is thus his expected productivity according to
the principal￿ s (posterior) beliefs, taking into account the principal￿ s e¢ cient investment rule. The
expectation about the agent￿ s productivity in the second period depends on ￿rst-period outcomes,
so the agent takes the reputational risk of ￿rst-period investment into account. Given that the
agent receives his ￿rst-period payment before investment decisions are made and that he is not
bound to remain in the agency relationship in the following period, the equilibrium investment
rule must maximize the agent￿ s ex-ante expectation of second-period utility. Absent agent risk
aversion, the ￿rst-period investment rule would maximize ￿nancial returns for the principal (like
the second-period investment rule) plus the agent￿ s perception of bene￿ts from learning about
ability that investment provides (through its e⁄ect on second-period remuneration). The bene￿ts
from learning about ability are the gains from optimally revising the second-period investment
rule after updating beliefs about agent ability. Because the agent is risk averse, however, the
reputational risk of ￿rst-period investment associated with second-period remuneration is costly
to him, so with risk aversion there is less ￿rst-period investment than socially optimal. At the
extreme, if the cost of investment in terms of reputational risk to the agent is greater than the
expected bene￿t from learning, there will be no investment in the ￿rst period independent of how
high expected revenues may be after receiving a particularly good signal. An overcon￿dent agent
overestimates the bene￿ts from learning about ability, so agent overcon￿dence reduces the agency
cost arising from risk aversion in a career-concerns setting.
Section 4 discusses the e⁄ects of overcon￿dence when both agent and principal can bind them-
selves to the agency relationship across periods. Because the principal can commit to remain in the
3The setup in Holmstr￿m and Ricart i Costa (1986) served as a blueprint for the setup in this paper. The most
notable di⁄erence between the two is that we will not allow the agent to withhold information from the principal. In
their model, the agent is given de facto veto power which he exercises by withholding information. Such extension
implies that the equilibrium contract might include a bonus for investment to the agent, but does not otherwise a⁄ect
the results and would rather cloud the intuition of our model.
3agency relationship, she is able to fully insure the agent against reputational risk. In a common-
priors setting, the agent would in fact be fully insured in equilibrium: he would receive the same
payment in both periods, independent of whether investment is undertaken or not and indepen-
dent of outcome following ￿rst-period investment. The investment rule that is implemented by the
principal in equilibrium maximizes ￿nancial returns to investing in the second period, and the sum
of ￿nancial and learning returns to investing in the ￿rst period. Therefore, there is no agency cost
arising from career concerns in this case, since full insurance makes them innocuous.
When allowing for disagreement, recall that an overcon￿dent agent overestimates the returns
to learning following ￿rst-period investment. For this reason, he disagrees with the principal re-
garding the distribution of outcomes conditional on investment: an overcon￿dent agent expects to
see higher project revenue following investment, on average, than the principal does. The agent￿ s
second-period payment will thus be contingent on ￿rst-period outcome; principal and agent will
optimally wager on outcomes because of their disagreement. Both principal and agent ￿nd it ben-
e￿cial to accept a lower payment following outcome realizations she/he deems relatively unlikely in
return for higher payment following outcome realizations she/he deems relatively more likely.4 As
a consequence, the ￿rst-period investment rule is distorted from the principal￿ s perceived optimal
investment rule. Because the agent￿ s well being is directly a⁄ected by the investment rule, de la
Rosa (2006) shows that he is willing to ￿pay￿the principal for control￿ for them to set a rule that
is more in line with his perception of the bene￿ts of ￿rst-period investment. Also, since an over-
con￿dent agent overestimates his expected second-period utility when signing the contract, he will
receive higher ￿rst-period payment compared to the common-priors case because of intertemporal-
insurance motives.
Section 5 allows for the agent to quit the agency relationship between periods. This introduces
an additional constraint: the agent￿ s second-period remuneration is bounded below by the prin-
cipals￿(posterior) expectation of agent productivity. In a common-priors setting, Holmstr￿m and
Ricart i Costa (1986) show that the agent￿ s ￿rst-period salary must be lower than his expected ￿rst-
period productivity. This stems from the fact that in providing insurance the principal will pay him
more than his expected productivity following unfavorable ￿rst-period outcome realizations, but
cannot pay him less than his expected productivity following favorable realizations. As discussed
4Maximilian R￿ger, my discussant at the Incentives in Economics BGPE Conference, noted that a risk-averse
agent dislikes mean-preserving spreads, and that from the principal￿ s point of view an overcon￿dent agent disliked
them less. This perspective is correct and the reader can ￿nd it helpful in interpreting the result, but it obscures
the mechanism behind the result. Pareto-optimal wagering between two disagreeing parties actually allows each to
receive a mean-enhancing spread according to their respective beliefs. So an overcon￿dent agent is, in fact, accepting
a riskier contract because it o⁄ers a higher expected value.
4before, agent overcon￿dence alleviates the problems arising from career concerns for a risk-averse
agent because he deems the bene￿ts from learning to be high. In terms of second-period salary,
higher agent overcon￿dence implies higher salary volatility. The e⁄ect of agent overcon￿dence on
￿rst-period remuneration is ambiguous in this case. An overcon￿dent agent expects high remuner-
ation in the second period after the principal updates her beliefs (which are overly pessimistic from
the agent￿ s point of view). Because of the intertemporal-insurance motive mentioned before, he will
tend to prefer higher ￿rst-period salary. Because of the wagering e⁄ect, however, he is willing to
trade lower ￿rst-period salary for higher second-period salaries following good outcome realizations
that the agent believes are more likely than the principal does.
Section 6 concludes and discusses the results of the model in terms of the ongoing debate
regarding executive compensation. Among other things, I argue that golden parachutes might be
excessive if they are set by doing calculations based on common-prior models and that although
equilibrium requires that some measure of control is passed on to the agent, full delegation might
be problematic in a world with disagreement.
2 Model Setup
In our model there are two periods t = 1;2 which are technologically identical and independent.
Several principals compete to contract with the agent by making simultaneous contract o⁄ers, so
that in equilibrium the agent￿ s perceived expected utility is maximized subject to zero expected
pro￿ts for the contracting principal. We will allow for di⁄erent commitment horizons to the agency
relationship. If the agent accepts a contract o⁄er, at the beginning of each period he observes the
signal st 2 St ￿ R, which is public, veri￿able, and correlated with (potential) net payo⁄ from some
given investment project in that period. The signal st is random, and has cumulative distribution
function G. Net payo⁄ from investment also depends on the realization of ￿t 2 ￿t ￿ R, a random
variable independent of st whose distribution depends on the agent￿ s ability. Speci￿cally, net payo⁄
from investment, qt, is
qt = st + ￿t:
As in Holmstr￿m (1982), both principal and agent are uncertain about the agent￿ s ability; there
is no private information in this model. Deviating from most of the current literature on agency
theory, we will allow for principals and agent to hold heterogeneous prior beliefs regarding the
agent￿ s ability. Furthermore, both principals and agent are aware of their disagreement (more on
this below). Let FP
t denote the cumulative distribution function of ￿t according to the principals￿
beliefs at time t. FP
1 depends solely on the principals￿prior beliefs, while FP
2 incorporates the new
5information conveyed by ￿1 following ￿rst-period investment if it is undertaken. The agent￿ s beliefs
are denoted by a superscript A; according to his beliefs, ￿t has c.d.f. FA
t . Principals and agent
￿agree to disagree￿in their prior assessment regarding agent ability, and they both update their
beliefs according to Bayes￿ s rule after observing ￿rst-period outcomes.
The assumption that principals share the same beliefs while at the same time openly disagreeing
with the agent may seem peculiar. If we were to allow for principals to disagree, the competition
between them would resemble a public- or private-value auction depending on whether principals￿
beliefs are publicly or privately known￿ see de la Rosa (2007)￿ but the results and message of our
model would not be a⁄ected. The idea that principal and agent do not update their prior beliefs
after the communication implicit in the contracting game may raise even more eyebrows. For our
purposes, the only crucial assumption to hold is that updating is not complete, which, as noted by
Morris (1995), seems consistent with everyday observation. Some theoretical models of behavior
give plausible explanations for such imperfect updating. Eyster and Rabin (2005) note that if
players in a private-information game fail to interpret other players￿actions as conveyors of private
information, asymmetric posterior beliefs will survive even in fully-separating equilibria of the game
(in our case, principals and agent could have played a previous game in which beliefs are shared,
and the agent has some private information about ability). Gervais and Odean (2001) explore the
possibility that agents do not update their beliefs in Bayesian fashion, so that successful agents
develop overcon￿dence because they overweight the informative content of successful outcomes
and underweight the content of failures (once again, previous rounds of observation under these
assumptions would lead to principals and agent disagreeing about the agent￿ s ability). For further
motivation, consider the following thought experiment. The agent is a ￿new guy,￿ so there are
no previous observations of his actual ability. The principals hold as prior beliefs the average
distribution of productivity, and they know that new guys tend to be overly optimistic about their
ability. The agent knows very little about his own ability himself, but is overcon￿dent. He might
be aware of overcon￿dence, but as the psychology literature surveyed by Taylor and Brown (1988)
suggests, does not completely correct for it. When principal and agent meet, the principal is not
surprised to learn that the agent is overcon￿dent, and the agent is not surprised to ￿nd out that
the principal is not optimistic, since ￿everyone￿ tends to be overcon￿dent. Principal and agent
learn nothing from each other￿ s beliefs in this case and there is no updating.
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral, and the agent risk averse. For notational simplicity,
I assume that there is no intertemporal discounting, that both the principal￿ s and the agent￿ s utility
are additively separable across periods, and that the agent cannot borrow or lend so that he fully
6consumes his salary in each period. The agent￿ s two-period utility can thus be written as
u(w1;w2) = u(w1) + u(w2).
The principal￿ s utility in period t is revenues from investment net of any payments made to the
agent:
qt ￿ wt.
Following Holmstr￿m and Ricart i Costa (1986), I assume that payment to the agent is made at
the beginning of each period. In this setting, a general contract is characterized by a pair (w;￿)
where w = (w1;w2 (s1;￿1)) speci￿es the salaries paid to the agent, and ￿ = (￿1 (s1);￿2 (s1;￿1;s2))
speci￿es the investment rule￿ either invest in the project or not￿ ￿t 2 f1;0g that will be followed
in each period. The investment rule is assumed to be enforceable.
3 Single-Period Contracts
Consider the case in which neither the agent nor the principal can bind themselves to the agency
relationship for more than one period at a time. In such a setting, the agent is always paid his
expected productivity at the beginning of each period, and thus receives all the bene￿ts￿ and bears
all the costs￿ from learning about ability when investment is undertaken in the ￿rst period. In this
setting we can isolate the e⁄ects of overcon￿dence on the career-concerns problem.5 We can ￿nd
the equilibrium recursively, working backwards from the second period.
3.1 Second-Period Equilibrium Contract
In the second period the agent no longer has career concerns, given that his payment w2 is received
at the beginning of the period and is thus independent of that period￿ s investment decision and out-
come. The equilibrium contract maximizes the agent￿ s perceived second-period expected utility￿ so
it maximizes w2￿ subject to non-negative expected pro￿ts for the principal. This constraint can





2 dG ￿ w2 ￿ 0,
where s1 and ￿1 are the actual realizations of these variables and FP
2 incorporates the information
about agent ability conveyed by the realization of ￿1 if investment was undertaken in the ￿rst period
5Absent career concerns, overcon￿dence a⁄ects the equilibrium contract only when the agent￿ s remuneration can be
made contingent on same-period outcomes following investment. Restricting attention to single-period contracts, the
outcome of the investment project a⁄ects contracting only insofar as investing provides information about the agent￿ s
ability (about the mean of ￿), so studying single-period contracts allows us to isolate the e⁄ects of overcon￿dence
through this channel alone.
7(if no investment is undertaken, since st and ￿t are independent, FP
2 = FP
1 ￿ the principals do not













2 , the mean of ￿2 according to the principals￿(posterior) beliefs. Note
that if no investment is made in the ￿rst period, ￿P
2 j￿1(s1)=0= ￿P
1 , where ￿P
1 denotes the mean




1 . In what follows, if there is no
￿rst-period investment, ￿￿P
2 (￿1)￿should be interpreted as ￿P
1 .
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium is characterized by the agent receiving the full expected pro-
ductivity and by an investment rule ￿￿
2 (s1;￿1;s2) which maximizes it. The equilibrium investment
rule is thus characterized by
￿￿









Given that the principal can guarantee zero investment payo⁄ by choosing not to invest, the equi-
librium investment rule is the optimal investment rule according to the principal￿ s beliefs: invest
if and only if expected pro￿ts from investing are non-negative. That is, ￿￿
2 = 1 if and only if
s2 + ￿P






















2 (￿1) = 0.
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 If the agent is paid at the beginning of each period and only single-period contracts






￿ so that investment














2 (￿1) = 0,































2 (￿1) denotes the posterior expected value of
￿2 according to the principal￿ s beliefs after ￿rst-period outcomes have been observed.
Given that the principal receives the full marginal bene￿t from investing after paying w2 to the
agent at the beginning of the second period, it is intuitive that the equilibrium investment rule will
be the optimal investment rule according to the principal￿ s beliefs at the time of contracting.
83.2 First-Period Equilibrium Contract
In the ￿rst period, the equilibrium contract maximizes the agent￿ s two-period expected utility
(according to his beliefs), subject to non-negative pro￿ts for the principal during the ￿rst period
(according to her beliefs), taking into account the second-period equilibrium contract characterized































Note that the agent evaluates expected utility according to his (prior) beliefs, while it is the prin-
cipals￿beliefs that are relevant when evaluating the non-negative pro￿ts condition.









The maximization problem is therefore reduced to choosing the ￿rst-period investment rule that
maximizes the agent￿ s perceived lifetime expected utility. Note that if investment is undertaken
during the ￿rst period, then the agent￿ s second-period salary depends on how the realization of ￿1
a⁄ects the principal￿ s posterior beliefs regarding the distribution of ￿2.
Given that s1 and ￿1 are independently distributed, and that the two periods are technologically
independent, we can again express the equilibrium investment rule ￿1 (s1) as a hurdle rate s￿
1, so
that investment is undertaken in the ￿rst period if and only if s1 ￿ s￿
1. Let S￿
1 ￿ fs1 : s1 ￿ s￿
1g.


































Given some ￿rst-period investment rule, the agent judges the likelihood of each realization of ￿1
according to his prior beliefs and takes into account how the principal updates her beliefs after
observing ￿1. The agent evaluates expected second-period utility according to his beliefs, but
incorporates the fact that w2 depends on the principals￿ updated beliefs about his ability.

























The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 If the agent is paid at the beginning of each period and only single-period contracts
are feasible, the ￿rst-period contract is characterized by a hurdle rate s￿
1￿ so that investment is
undertaken if and only if s1 ￿ s￿









































































can be interpreted as the value of learning about agent ability according to the beliefs of a risk-







to be revised optimally following the ￿rst-period realization of ￿1. Note that w2 (￿) is










￿ 0. Holmstr￿m and Ricart i
Costa (1986) identify the value of learning, and show that under common priors this ￿rst-period
investment rule is socially optimal: setting s￿
1 = ￿￿1 ￿ v (F) maximizes expected ￿nancial and
￿human-capital￿(or learning) returns to investment.6
In the case of agent overcon￿dence￿ when he holds prior beliefs regarding ￿1 that are overly
optimistic relative to the principal￿ s￿ under fairly weak assumptions the agent overestimates the
bene￿ts from learning relative to the principal (see appendix for su¢ cient conditions). Note that
the principal￿ s posterior belief about agent productivity ￿P
2 (￿1) is a function of her prior beliefs
FP
1 and of the observed realization of ￿1. An overcon￿dent agent overestimates the likelihood
of realizations of ￿1 that are consistent with his prior beliefs relative to the likelihood of those
6We dropped the A and P superscripts in the last expression since they are super￿ uous under common priors.
10realizations consistent with the principals￿beliefs. Because of this, the agent believes that the
principal will tend to update their beliefs about the agent￿ s average productivity upwards given
investment in the ￿rst period (again, see appendix). He therefore overestimates￿ relative to the











Consider now the case of a risk-averse agent. The ￿rst thing to note is that the presence of
career concerns and agent risk aversion imply that the equilibrium investment rule will be more
conservative than in the case of a risk-neutral agent.7 When only single-period contracts are feasible,
the agent receives all the bene￿ts, and bears all the costs, of learning about ability. Given that
he will be paid his expected productivity in the second period, it is only his perception about the
value of learning that guides the decision regarding the ￿rst-period investment rule. His attitudes
towards risk, his prior beliefs about the distribution of ￿1, and the principal￿ s prior beliefs are thus
all relevant in equilibrium.
The distortion introduced by the agent￿ s risk aversion can be so strong that investment is never


















given any possible hurdle rate s￿
1, the equilibrium investment rule will dictate no investment inde-
pendent of the realization of s1￿ even though this implies that he will receive zero salary during
the ￿rst period. Given the agent￿ s risk aversion, he might prefer to eliminate reputational risk
altogether and accept a contract with no investment (or simply not accept any o⁄er and take his
outside option). This result is parallel to the observation made by Hermalin (1993) that, under
single-period contracting and up-front payments to the agent, if allowed to freely choose a project
among many alternatives the agent will always choose the riskiest project available, independent
of the project￿ s expected returns. In that particular setting, this allows him to minimize his repu-
tational risk by maximizing ￿noise￿regarding his ability.
Agent overcon￿dence causes the equilibrium investment rule to be more liberal, opposite to
the e⁄ect of agent risk aversion (see appendix). From the agent￿ s perspective, the cost of ￿rst-
period investment in terms of reputational risk (i.e. second-period payment risk) reduces the value
of learning following investment. In the presence of agent overcon￿dence, the agent perceives
the bene￿ts of ￿rst-period investment in terms of learning about ability to be higher than in the
common-priors case, since he expects the principals to update their beliefs favorably more often































follows immediately from the
proof of part (a) of Proposition 3 in (Holmstr￿m and Ricart i Costa, 1986, p. 850).
114 Long-term, bilaterally binding contracts
Now consider a situation in which both principal and agent can bind themselves to the agency
relationship across periods (i.e. neither participant can ￿quit￿after the ￿rst period). The results
in a single-period contracting setting discussed above point to the fact that agent overcon￿dence
a⁄ects the equilibrium contract in the presence of career concerns through the agent￿ s perception
about the bene￿ts of investment (in terms of learning about ability). When principal and agent can
bind themselves to the agency relationship, the principal can insure the agent against second-period
payment risk following investment in the ￿rst period. The agent will not be fully insured, however,
if he disagrees with the principal about the likelihood of some realizations of ￿1; agent and principal
will wager on those realizations.
All payments to the agent are made by the beginning of period 2, so the second-period hurdle









2 (￿1) = 0,
and the agent always reports signal s2 in the second period.
The equilibrium contract maximizes the agent￿ s perceived lifetime expected utility, subject to
non-negative perceived lifetime expected pro￿ts for the principal. Let ^ s1 denote the equilibrium















































The equilibrium contract solves this maximization problem; it is characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 If the agent is paid at the beginning of each period and bilaterally binding contracts
are feasible, the equilibrium contract is characterized by ￿rst-period hurdle rate ^ s1 implicitly de￿ned
by


























































2 (￿1) = 0,
and, if beliefs can be characterized by probability density functions fA
1 and fP






to the agent such that















































If principal and agent hold the same prior beliefs regarding the distribution of ￿1, then the
equilibrium contract is very simple: the agent is fully insured, so that w1 = w2 (and thus is
indi⁄erent between investment rules), and the hurdle rate is the one that the principal deems
socially optimal: s￿
1 + ￿1 + v (￿1) = 0 ￿ it maximizes both ￿nancial and human-capital returns to
investment.





is not constant because principal and agent
wager on some realizations of ￿1. Other than this ex-ante Pareto-optimal wagering, the agent is
receiving as much insurance as possible; his marginal utility of consumption is constant both across





















re￿ ects the value of learning about the agent￿ s ability for the principal, net of the di⁄erence between
expected payment to the agent conditional on ￿rst-period investment and payment to the agent













is ambiguous in the
general case. When the principal transfers a positive stake in the expected gains from learning to the













> 0, the marginal bene￿t to
the principal from ￿rst-period investment is reduced. The opposite is true if the principal transfers

















> 0 in equilibrium,
then the agent believes he is strictly better o⁄ following a decision to invest in the ￿rst period than
if no investment is undertaken, in which case he will be willing to give up some of his expected
payment in return for a more liberal investment rule.
Disagreement is likely to cause the equilibrium investment rule to be more liberal than in the
case of common priors (see discussion in the appendix). First-period investment allows principal
and agent to wager on the realization of ￿1, so the value of ￿rst-period investment is deemed larger
by both than in the case of common priors.
8See de la Rosa (2007) for a more elaborate exposition of this result.
135 Long-term, unilaterally binding contracts
Finally, consider the setting in which the agent is allowed to ￿quit￿the agency relationship, but
cannot be ￿￿red￿by the principal￿ the setting of interest for Holmstr￿m and Ricart i Costa (1986).
This adds one more constraint to the maximization problem to which the equilibrium contract is
a solution: second-period payment to the agent can never fall below the market expectation of his
productivity. Given that the agent can quit after the ￿rst period and work for another principal
during the second, he will never receive less than his second-period expected productivity (evaluated































































It maximizes the agent￿ s perceived lifetime expected utility subject to non-negative expected pro￿ts
for the principal and the ￿no-quitting￿constraint. This last constraint simply places a lower bound
on the agent￿ s second-period salary.
In a common-priors setting, as shown by Holmstr￿m and Ricart i Costa (1986), this unam-
biguously implies that the agent will be subject to a higher amount of risk in terms of remu-
neration than when bilaterally binding contracts are feasible9. Because the agent￿ s second-period
salary is never lower than his expected productivity and is actually higher for some bad real-
izations, on average the contracting principal pays the agent more than his expected productiv-
ity during the second period. For this reason, and because she cannot sustain negative lifetime
expected pro￿ts in equilibrium, she pays the agent less than her expectation of agent produc-
tivity during the ￿rst period (using our notation and dropping the superscripts, w1 < ￿1 and
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2(￿2(￿1)) (s2 + ￿2 (￿1))dGdF1).
The latter result remains when we allow for heterogeneous beliefs. Compared to the bilaterally-
binding-contracts setting we studied in Section 4 above, if the no-quitting constraint binds for some
realizations of ￿1, the principal must pay less to the agent in the ￿rst period. It is also the case
that she will pay the agent less in the event of no ￿rst-period investment and for those realizations
9Recall that the long-term bilaterally-binding contract under common priors fully insures the agent (i.e. w1 =
w2 (￿2 (￿1)) 8￿1).







































is necessarily lower for those realizations of ￿1 under which the quitting constraint binds. Just as
in the common-priors case, this implies that the agent￿ s possibility to quit hinders the extent to
which the principal can o⁄er him intertemporal insurance. In the case of heterogeneous beliefs,
the fact that the agent can quit the agency relationship after the ￿rst period implies that he will
bear more risk given some realizations of ￿1 (for those under which the no-quitting constraint is
binding), but it also limits the extent to which he can wager against the principal compared to the
bilaterally-binding-contracts setting.
Proposition 4 If the agent is paid at the beginning of each period and only the principal can commit
to remain in the agency relationship, the equilibrium contract is characterized by ￿rst-period hurdle
rate ^ s1 implicitly de￿ned by


























































2 (￿1) = 0,
and, if beliefs can be characterized by probability density functions fA
1 and fP


















































and w1 are implicitly de￿ned by














































It is still true that under weak assumptions an overcon￿dent agent overestimates the value of
learning relative to the principals￿beliefs, and that, as a consequence, the equilibrium investment
rule is more liberal.
An interesting question is regarding the e⁄ect of overcon￿dence on the level of pay. We know
that the principal will, just as in the case of common priors, meet outside o⁄ers. Under other
realizations of ￿1, the principal will pay the agent more than his expected productivity for two
reasons. First, as under common priors, after particularly bad realizations of ￿1 the principal
may pay more to the agent because of an insurance motive. Second, and confounded with the
￿rst, optimal insurance under heterogeneous beliefs is not a ￿xed wage but rather an optimal
wagering schedule under which the agent receives higher pay after a realization of ￿1 that he
deemed relatively more likely. What, then, can we say about the level of ￿rst-period pay? Given
that the agent enjoys intertemporal insurance, and that an overcon￿dent agent overestimates his
expected second-period pay relative to the principals￿beliefs, we should expect him to receive a
higher initial pay. Accepting lower initial pay, however, would allow him to wager more strongly
with the principal. Since competition among principals implies zero expected pro￿ts according to
their beliefs, more wagering necessarily implies higher expected payment to the agent according to
his beliefs. Through this channel, then, we should expect an overcon￿dent agent to receive lower
initial pay. The overall e⁄ect of overcon￿dence on ￿rst-period pay is thus ambiguous.
6 Conclusion
The setting in which we allow only the agent to quit the agency relationship seems to be the most
realistic if we are to study incentive compensation schemes. Managers and other employees are
prevented, by law, to bind themselves unconditionally to an employer. Firms, on the other hand,
tend to o⁄er very costly severance packages to their executives (usually referred to as a ￿golden
parachute￿ ), and law requires that every employee receive adequate compensation if they are ￿red
without just cause, so that the ￿rm is de facto binding itself to the agency relationship under many
outcome realizations.
We can interpret some of the results of the models using the language of the ongoing debate
regarding executive compensation. Under common priors, when the agent has the possibility to
quit the agency relationship the principal simply ￿meets outside o⁄ers,￿which can be reminiscent
16of practices in both the corporate arena and in academia. Furthermore, the principal may provide
the agent with a ￿golden parachute￿by committing to give higher compensation than the agent￿ s
expected productivity after unfavorable ￿rst-period outcomes. Under heterogeneous beliefs, the
agent gets compensation above his expected productivity not only following very bad realizations
(because of insurance motives), but also following some particularly good realizations (because of
wagering motives). Extraordinarily high executive pay is repeatedly discussed in the open arena (a
news search for ￿executive pay￿is thickly populated with discussions about excessive pay relative
to performance; take for example Dobrzynski (1996) and Deutsch (2008)); optimal contracting
with a ￿lucky￿overcon￿dent manager could be part of the explanation of the cases that are used
as an example in these discussions.10 If heterogeneous beliefs are relevant in setting executive
compensation contracts, then we should expect to observe exceedingly high and variable salaries
following good results. The second thing to note is that the model suggests that managers should
receive more of a silver rather than a golden parachute: given that the manager receives pay
above his expected productivity for some favorable realizations, he should only be insured against
very unfavorable realizations, and the level of pay then should be lower than in the alternative
common-priors setting.
Finally, there are some lessons to be drawn regarding delegation decisions. Under common
priors, given that the only di⁄erence between principal and agent is regarding risk aversion, aligning
incentives (e.g. giving a stock-option package to the agent Æ la Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2003))
and then delegating investment decisions is optimal. Under heterogeneous beliefs, delegation can
be very costly for the principal; an overcon￿dent agent may pick investment projects based on
beliefs about outcome distribution that are very far removed from the principal￿ s beliefs. David
Viniar, CFO of Goldman Sachs, is frequently quoted as saying ￿We were seeing things that were
25-standard deviation moves, several days in a row￿(see, e.g. Larsen (2007)). The fact that their
asset valuation models calculated the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis as a near impossibility, and
that management went along with those estimates, is a telling anecdote. I venture a guess that,
had Goldman Sachs￿ s investors and owners been consulted a year or two before this quote, many
would not have placed the likelihood of those events as 25 standard deviations away. There are
gains to hiring overcon￿dent managers, but shareholders and boards need to keep this in mind
when deciding how much of the decision power to delegate.
10Studying whether it is in fact only the lucky ones, opposed to what many critics of excessive executive pay argue,
might be enlightening. Note that one should not reduce the de￿nition of ￿lucky￿to high pro￿ts, and include any
measure that a⁄ects pay.
17A Appendix
In order to provide proofs of some of the statements in the text, we need to be more speci￿c about
the de￿nition of overcon￿dence and assumptions regarding the underlying distributions.
De￿nition 1 (FOSD) The distribution F (￿) ￿rst-order stochastically dominates G(￿) if, for every





(Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, De￿nition 6.D.1).
De￿nition 2 (overcon￿dence) We will say that the agent is overcon￿dent (about his ability)
relative to the principals if FA
1 ￿rst-order stochastically dominates FP
1 .
By de￿ning overcon￿dence in this way, we ensure that the agent￿ s expectation about own ability






Assumption 1 (monotonicity) We will assume that the principals￿posterior expectation regard-




2 ) is monotonically increasing in the ￿rst-period realization of
ability.
This is a very weak assumption to place on updating. It simply states that better ability
realizations are good news in terms of expected future ability. Indeed, when considering many
examples of conjugate families of distributions we ￿nd that this is the case:
￿ If ￿t is assumed to be normally distributed with unknown mean ￿￿ and known precision h￿,





2 (￿1) = ￿1￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1;
11Note that our analysis could be extended to cover another type of overcon￿dence, de￿ned as overestimating
the precision of prior beliefs. We would then say that the agent is relatively overcon￿dent in terms of precision
if F
A
1 second-order stochastically dominates F
P
1 . This would require more stringent assumptions in order to reach
general conclusions and the interpretation in terms of executive compensation would be slightly di⁄erent; see de la
Rosa (2006) for a one-period example of this type of overcon￿dence with normally-distributed priors. In that case,
the agent will receive high payment for outcomes close to the average, but lower around the tails. In the current
model and when the agent can quit, this would mean lower payment for very bad outcomes, matching outside o⁄ers






￿ If ￿t is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution with unknown mean ￿￿ and the principals￿









￿ If ￿t is assumed to be distributed negative binomial with unknown parameter p and known
parameter r, and the principals￿prior belief about p is that it is distributed beta with shape












￿ If ￿t is assumed to be distributed exponentially with unknown rate parameter w, and the
principals￿prior belief about w is that it is distributed gamma with with shape ￿P and scale
￿P so that ￿P
1 =
￿P
￿P (￿￿ = 1






￿ If ￿t is assumed to be distributed Bernoulli with unknown probability of success ￿￿, and the
principals￿prior belief about ￿￿ is that it is distributed beta with shape parameters ￿P and






￿P + ￿P + 1
:
￿ Finally, if ￿t is assumed to be distributed on the interval (0;2w) where w is unknown, and
the principals￿prior belief about w is that it is distributed Pareto with scale parameter wP
0
















See (DeGroot, 1970, Chapter 9) for the properties of posterior distributions that were used to
derive the results about monotonicity of ￿P
2 (￿1) above.
12Note that with a concrete example as this, it is clear that an overcon￿dent agent believes that the principal



















1 ;h￿ < 1.
19Claim 1 (page 11) An overcon￿dent agent overestimates￿ relative to the principal￿ s beliefs￿ the






































































































Claim 2 (page 11) Agent overcon￿dence causes the equilibrium investment rule to be more liberal.
Proof. For any given FP














































will be lower when the agent is overcon￿dent than when he shares the principals￿beliefs.13
Claim 3 (page 13) Disagreement is likely to cause the equilibrium investment rule to be more
liberal than in the case of common priors.
13Furthermore, if we refer to a ￿more overcon￿dent￿ agent as one holding prior beliefs whose distribution ￿rst-
order stochastically dominates that of the beliefs of a ￿less overcon￿dent￿agent, it follows that s
￿
1 is decreasing in
overcon￿dence.

































This is because each inequality above re￿ ects the gains that the principal and the agent, respectively,
expect from wagering after a decision to invest in the ￿rst period. Given that in this setting both
are optimally wagering based on their disagreement, I would expect that both would rather wager





. If this is the case, of course, the claim follows immediately
from this observation.
Claim 4 (page 16) An overcon￿dent agent overestimates his expected second-period pay relative
to the principals￿beliefs.
We need a further assumption regarding agent overcon￿dence to provide su¢ cient conditions






function of ￿1. Although this is the case when the no-quitting constraint binds (expected agent




















1 (￿1) is non-decreasing in ￿1.






is monotonically increasing in ￿1.




































1 (￿1) follows then immediately from De￿nition 1 (Assumption 2 implies over-
con￿dence as de￿ned in De￿nition 2).
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